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Abstract Several surplus production-based bioeconomic models are applied
to the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands (NWHI) commercial lobster fishery.
The model which best explains the biological dynamics of the fishery is a
modification of the Fox model developed hy the authors. Economic costs are
applied within a number of conceptual frameworks to develop the first inte-
grated bioeconomic model of the fishery. In another development, the oppor-
tunity cost of labor based on crew share at the open access equilibrium level
of fishing effort is used instead of proxy wage levels. Given the costs incurred,
the fishery appears to be self-regulating in terms of long-term fishing effort for
maximum sustainable yield.
Keywords Biological production models, fisheries economics, fisheries man-
agement, spiny lobster, slipper lobster.
Introduction
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands (NWHI) lobster fishery is relatively unusual
amongst the world's lobster fisheries being a distant-water fishery landing pre-
dominantly a frozen tailed product. For the first twelve years of its utilization
(1977-1988), laissez faire conditions predominated with a minimum of biological
regulation. However in 1989, problems of over-capacity were not resolved
through voluntary exit of marginal producers, and the growth of Hawaii's com-
mercial longline fisheries posed the possibility of short-term entry by additional
vessels. As a result, proposals were circulated to implement limited entry into the
NWHI lobster fishery, and interest was raised in determining the optimal level of
harvest.
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The fishery has been actively regulated and monitored only since 1983, thus
providing a very short time-series of data for modeling the biological population
dynamics. Similarly, fishing vessel operations in the NWHI lobster fishery and in
alternative fisheries have not been stable, with substantial switching between
fisheries. As a result, some of the statistical grounds for modeling the fishery
appear weak. On the other hand, interest in developing a more refined manage-
ment system for this fishery is growing, suggesting that even a preliminary model
of the fishery would be valuable as a benchmark for evaluating alternative man-
agement measures. The empirical results of these models are surprisingly robust.
Two questions this study addresses are: a) what is the appropriate biological
model to use for bioeconomic purposes in this fishery, and b) given a relatively
new fishery, what are the implications of the choice between models? Clearly the
period of time in which the NWHI lobster fishery has been prosecuted precludes
afull test of the alternative surplus production model we develop in this paper. We
have attempted to do this in another context (Yoshimoto and Clarke, in press). On
the other hand, fishery management is an immediate and on-going process. In lieu
of an integrated bioeconomic modeling approach to the problem, fishery managers
are left with a number of discrete pieces of information on the fishery management
problem but with no overall perspective on the potential range of alternative
solutions to that problem. We believe one advantage of surplus production bio-
economic models is the use of limited information to provide such guidance.
Obviously the results need to be tempered by a flexible and adaptive approach to
management actions.
This paper presents the first full bioeconomic model of the NWHI lobster
fishery. After a brief historical summary of how the fishery developed, we begin
with the derivation of biological and economic production functions. Four estab-
lished surplus production models along with a new refinement to a previously
accepted model are used in developing a bioeconomic analysis of the fishery.
Biological parameters are estimated from a limited time series of annual fishery-
wide catch and effort data, then combined with price and cost information to
construct the bioeconomic models. The third part of the paper compares the
models. The fourth and fifth parts summarize the results of the bioeconomic
models and their implications for the NWHI lobster fishery. Finally, we present
some thoughts on the use of alternative biological surplus production models on
management strategy.
Background
Commercially viable concentrations of the spiny lobster Panulirus marginatus
(henceforth referred to as spiny lobster) were discovered in the 1970s in the
NWHI (Fig. I), a group of islands, banks, and reefs extending 1,200 nautical miles
northwest of the main Hawaiian Islands (Uchida and Tagami. 1984). Almost im-
mediately, a commercial trapping fishery for live spiny lobster developed in Ha-
waii and grew rapidly to include 10 vessels, which in 1981 landed 350 metric tons
(t) with an ex-vessel value of $2.7 million. By 1982, the Honolulu market was
unable to absorb this relatively large volume of live lobster, ex-vessel prices
dropped, and the fleet contracted. At that time, some vessels began processing
spiny lobster at sea and landing frozen tails, allowing access to the woridwide
market for frozen lobster tails. Thereafter, vessel operators began expanding theirBioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 117
Figure 1. Hawaiian Islands with the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands demarcated by 161
degree west longitude.
efforts, and the fishery grew rapidly. Sixteen vessels participated in the NWHl
lobster fishery in 1985, the same year vessel operators began targeting and landing
significant quantities of the slipper lobster Scyliarides squammosus. which had
been an incidental catch.
By 1986, the NWHl had the largest slipper lobster fishery in the United States,
and its spiny lobster landings were second only to Florida's: combined landings
had jumped to 1,000 t; cx-vcssel revenue exceeded $6 million. Having developed
into an industrial, multispecies lobster fishery, it was composed of medium- to
large-sized fishing vessels (62-110 ft) traveling long distances and fishing for ex-
tended periods (Clarke and Pooley, 1988). However, entry and exit patterns
showed considerable turnover in vessel participation in the fishery.
The NWHl lobster fishery originally operated under State of Hawaii regula-
tions, but in March 1983, a federal fishery management plan (FMP) prepared by
the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council was implemented with
the objective of protecting the reproductive spawning biomass. Initially, the FMP
regulated only the spiny lobster fishery, but it was amended in 1987 to include
slipper lobster. Regulations included minimum sizes, escape-vented traps, and
returning berried females. Fishing effort was not restricted, except in a few areas
declared off-limits as marine mammal and sea bird refugia.
From a purely biological perspective, the NWHl lobster fishery presented a
unique situation in which fishery managers had relatively good estimates of the
pre-exploitation condition of spiny lobster stocks based on the exploratory re-
search surveys which preceded the commercial fishery. These initial surveys
allowed for comprehensive biological assessments of the spiny lobster fishery as
it developed (Uchida and Tagami. 1984; Polovina, 1989a). However, complica-
tions in monitoring the fishery quickly arose as the commercial fishery developed
new gear configurations and as the importance of the slipper lobster landings
grew. By 1986, effort levels appeared to be biologically excessive (Polovina et al.118 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
1987). and several economic studies were initiated by the Honolulu Laboratory
and the Council to examine management implications. But as fishing intensity
stabilized, interest waned in managing the fishery through economic regulation
until an apparent recruitment (or catchability) crisis late in 1989. The Crustacean
FMP was amended in 1991 to limit entry into the fishery based on current levels
of participation, and a flexible fishing season based on an annual quota was
proposed for 1992. Economic optimization of the fishery has not really been
considered; the limited entry and seasonal regulations are pragmatic and oriented
toward preserving a threshold spawning biomass in the fishery (Polovina. 1991).
Methods
Production Models
Five models with distinctly different biological production relationships are as-
sessed for their applicability to the NWHl lobster fishery: the Schaefer (1957)
model, the Fox (1970) model, the Schnute (1977) modification of the Schaefer
model, a threshold-type model as presented by Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell
(1987). and our modified version of the Fox model. Hereafter, for the sake of
brevity the models will be referred to as the Schaefer, Fox. Schnute. Threshold.
and CY&P, respectively. They consist of three distinctly different production
(i.e.. yield and effort) relationships: The Schaefer and Schnute models have a
parabolic or logistic relationship, the Fox and CY&P models follow a Gompertz
curve (Richards. 1959), and the Threshold model has a logarithmic curve that
asymptotically approaches a maximum.
The Schaefer. Fox. Schnute, and CY&P models relate stock size, fishing
effort, and yield to one another. Stock size adjusts to different levels of effort, and
sustainable yield is a result of applied effort. As will be shown later, the yield-
effort relationships can be quite different in terms of predicted results. The Fox
model has had reasonable results when used for other lobster fisheries (Campbell
and Hall. 1987: P. Breen. personal communication 1989). To our knowledge, the
Threshold model has not previously been used for a lobster fishery. The Schnute
model was applied by Polovina (1989b) to a system of simultaneous production
relationships for forecasting in the NWHI lobster fishery. He estimated individual
bank parameters using area-by-area catch and effort data and pooling the area
results for a fishery-wide model.
The five models in our study are fit from the same NWHl logbook data used
by Polovina (1989b). but catch and effort are pooled for the entire NWHI fishery,'
We feel this more closely approximates economic considerations in the fishery.
Vessel operators frequently fish various banks during a trip, and the decision to
make a trip is not based on the average annual or seasonal productivity of any
individual bank.
The generalized stock production mode! (Pella and Tomlinson, 1969) is
' Whether bank-by-bank or fishery-wide analysis is appropriate biologically is a matter of
concern. Some aspects of recruitment are clearly fishery-wide {e.g., the circulation of
lobster phyllosomes throughout the archipelago) while others are bank-specific {e.g., set-
tling out of larvae). Polovina (1991) found the CY&P model applied to fishery-wide data
was consistent with bank-by-bank analysis.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 119
dX/dt = rX - (r/K)X"' - C; (1)
where dX/dt is the growth rate of biomass; r, the intrinsic growth; C, the catch
rate; X, the current biomass; and K, the maximum stock level or virgin biomass.
When m = 2, then
dX/dt = rX(l - X/K) - C, (2)
and the growth rate is of the logistic form. When m —* 1. then
dX/dt = rX ln(K/X) - C, (3)
and the growth rate follows a Gompertz curve (cf. Richards. 1959). The basic
difference between the logistic and Gompertz curves is that the logistic is sym-
metrical while the Gompertz is not, implying, in an extreme case, the potential
extinction of the fishery. Using the assumption of C = qEX, where E is the rate
of fishing effort, q is the catchability coefficient, and catch per unit effort (CPUE)
is defined by (/ = C/E, current biomass is given by A' = U/q. The resulting
biomass equation can then be used to convert Equations 2 and 3 into forms
directly applicable to annual catch and effort data. With the Pella and Tomlinson
(1969) method, an iterative procedure was tested to determine which value of m
best fits Equation 1. However, the true value of m could not be estimated from the
data on the NWHI lobster fishery because several quite different m values pro-
duce equivalently good fits. The R statistic, a measure of improved fit compared
to reliance on the mean catch as the parameter value, is >0.98 for m values
covering the range of those used in these production models: 2.0 (Schaefer), 1.01
(Fox), and 0.01 (Threshold). The fact that the true value of m could not be
estimated with the Pella and Tomlinson model is probably due to the relatively
short time series of data available (P. Tomlinson, personal communication 1990).
Two models use the finite difference approximation t/(//t//=*((/„ + , — t/^-i)/
2, where U,, is the average CPUE for a given year, n ( denotes the mean):
Schaefer: (V^^i - Un-i)/(2UJ = r - (r/(qK))(Un) - q(E^), (4)
Fox: (Un^., - Un-,)/(2Un) = r ln(qK) - r \n(U^) - qE^, (5)
where £„ is the total effort expended in year n. The parameters r, q, and K are
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with a time series of catch and effort
data."
^ It would be useful to compare our estimates of K with pre-exploitation or fishery-
independenl measures of biomass. Unfortunately, comparable estimates of pre-
exploitation biomass are not readily available because the gear used in early research
cruises failed to sample slipper lobster. Polovina and Tagami {1979) estimated spiny lobster
populations for a subsection of one of the banks (Necker Island) using depletion methods.
Uchida and Tagami (1984) extrapolate those results and report a NWHI wide spiny lobster
MSY range of between 2I0.0CK) and 435.000 lobsters above 8.25 centimeter carapace120 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
Many bioeconomic studies incorporate biological parameters that have been
estimated by the Schaefer and Fox models. Although some authors (e.g., Uhler,
1980) suggest that finite difference models may be useful for economic analysis,
others {e.g.. Schnute, 1977) have shown these models to be invalid for non-
equilibrium conditions and have suggested that modified versions be applied to
better represent the dynamic nature of fishery yield and effort interactions.
Schnute (1977) argues that a major problem with the Schaefer and Fox models is
that they can predict next year's CPUE without specifying next year's anticipated
effort, contradicting almost all theory on fisheries biology. Another problem in-
volves the finite difference approximation, which assumes that CPUE is linear
over the course of a given year. Based on a review on monthly CPUE data from
the NWHI lobster fishery (Clarke et al. 1987), this assumption is questionable.
Thus, the Schaefer and Fox models are presented for comparison purposes only,
while the Schnute, Threshold, and CY&P models are explored in greater detail in
our paper.
Schnute (1977:594) developed a modified version of the Schaefer model using
an integration procedure:
Schnute: ln(Un,,/U^) = r - (r/(qK)) (U^ + U^^,)/2
+ En^,)/2. (6)
For the CY&P model, we follow Schnute's lead and apply a similar approach
to the Fox model, using a Taylor approximation (derivation in Appendix A):
CY&P: ln(U^,i) = (2r/(2 -h r))ln(qK) + ((2 - r)/(2 + r))ln(Uj
- (q/(2 + r))(E^ -H E^,,). (7)
By using OLS, the three constants can be estimated from Equation 7 by
,) = cl -F c2 ln(UJ -F c3(E^ + E^^,); (8)
where r = 2(1 - c2)/(l -H c2), q- - c3(2 + r), and K =
model incorporates the same nonlinear assumptions as in the Schnute model, and,
as will be demonstrated, has a good fit to the NWHI commercial lobster fishery's
limited time series data.
The Threshold model presents an interesting twist in the conventional yield-
effort relationship. Unlike the previous models for which stock size varies with
effort, the Threshold model shows decreasing returns to effort after reaching a
critical level. This can be interpreted either as the result of competition among
vessels or long-term population adjustments (Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell, 1987).
The Threshold model shows catch reaching its maximum asymptotically, ex-
pressed as C = A - Be~^^, where C is catch and E is effort. The parameters A,
B, and k can be estimated with the transformation
length. However Ihe minimum size limit actually implemented was smaller: since the
inception of Federal management a legal-sized spiny lobster equates to approximately 7.7
centimeters carapace length while the legal slipper lobster size equates to an 8.3 centimeter
carapace (actual regulation is now by tail width).Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 121
ln(A - C^) = ln(B) - kE^; (9)
where C^ is the total catch, £„ is the total effort for year n. and A corresponds to
the maximum catch or threshold level of catch.^ Although not specified by the
original authors, we interpret k as the catchability coefficient and B as virgin
biomass. With a method similar to that employed by Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell
(1987), a value for A is chosen that is slightly higher than the highest combined
catch levels recorded for each species of lobster. The initial value of A is then
changed iteratively until the regression of ln(^ - C) against E gives the best fit in
terms of maximizing R^. The Threshold model has been used for tunas that are
exploited over only a portion of their range, but it seems applicable to a benthic
fishery as well. It can be applied to lobster stocks in the NWHI because not all of
the lobster population is subject to exploitation throughout the year. At certain
times of the year, lobster are less vulnerable to trapping because of environmental
effects {e.g.. sea state, water temperature) on behavioral activity, such as nightly
foraging (Karnofsky and Price, 1989). Finally, minimum size regulations and es-
cape vents limit the fishable proportion of the total population.
Catch and Effort Data
The basic unit of fishing effort in the NWHI lobster fishery is the trap-haul, and
all vessels currently participating in the fishery use black, plastic traps made by
one manufacturer. Bait and general fishing methods are also homogeneous
throughout the fleet, and although differences between vessels do exist, all trap-
hauls are assumed to be equally efficient for this analysis.
Catch and effort data for I982-I989 are presented in Table I. Length-
frequency information taken from research sampling has been used to adjust
1982-1987 slipper lobster categories to account for the implementation of man-
agement regulations in 1988."* Catch per trap-haul for the two species has been
combined into one unit stock because the targeting practices of fishermen are not
known and the habitat of the two types of lobster overlap.^
Price
The revenue function is created by applying Hawaii's 1986-1988 average ex-
vessel lobster price, adjusted for infiation, to the biological production functions.
^ At low levels of effort (E), the Threshold model can predict negative catch levels (C). This
is not a problem at reasonable effort levels. In an alternative specification, where A = B,
the Threshold model is non-linear.
•* Spiny lobster, the initial target species of the fishery, are reported in catch and effort logs
as either legal, sublegal. or berried (egg-bearing females). These categories are also used for
slipper lobster catches, wSich the fishermen voluntarily reported prior to their management
in 1988.
-'' The post-settlement growth rates of the two lobsters are similar reaching minimum legal
size at 3.1 and 3.3 years, respectively, for the spiny and slipper lobster (Polovina and
Moffitt, 1989). The habitat for the two species generally overlaps in that spiny lobster are
normally concentrated in waters 15-25 fathoms while slipper lobster concentrate at slightly
deeper depths of 20-30 fathoms. Nonetheless the two species show no definite delineation
by depth, and it is not possible to segregate effort by species from the catch and effort
reports submitted by fishermen. The problem of modeling these two species with one
production model has been raised repeatedly in the past two years, but no solution has been
found.122 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
Table 1
Number of Lobster Retained. Fishing Effort (Number of Trap-Hauls), and




























































Note: The 1983-1986 data are from Clarke et ai. (1987); 1987-1989 data are from Landgraf et al.
(1990).
"The 1982 catch is estimated from weight of lobster landed; effort is estimated by back-extrapolating
using 1983 levels of reporled trapping intensity (where 1982 trap-hauls per trip are 75% of the number
of trap-hauls per trip in 1983) and multiplying by the number of trips (« = 19) reported for that year.
'' The 1983 data are extrapolated from 9 months of actual data to account for the entire year.
I
Real ex-vessel prices (in U.S. dollars) for Hawaii's spiny and slipper lobsters,
calculated on a whole weight basis from nominal revenue data, adjusted for in-
flation to 1989 price index levels, are shown in Table 2 for 1982-1989 (Landgraf e/
al. 1990). The real (1988 base year) weighted average price of combined spiny and
slipper lobsters was $4.55 per lobster for 1986-1988. the period for which detailed
cost and effort data were available.
During the last 5 years. 95% of the lobster landed (by weight) from the NWHI
have been frozen tails (Landgrafe/ al. 1990). Although some of them are sold
locally to Hawaii's seafood wholesalers, most are transshipped to the U.S. main-
Table 2A
Average Nominal and ReaP Ex-Vessel Price'' per Pound (Round Weight) of


































































' Adjusted for inflation to 1989 Honolulu consumer price index levels
"In U.S. dollars.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 123
Table 2B
Average Nominal and Real** Ex-Vessel Price^ and Number of Combined Spiny
and Slipper Lobsters Landed in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Lobster
Fishery, 1982-1989
Price per Lobster
Year Nominal Real Number
1982 4.54 6.03 148,214
1983 2.52 3.25 234,700
1984 3.01 3.76 872,400
1985 3.25 3.83 1,812,700
1986 3.35 3.86 1,787,400
1987 5.41 5.94 737,800
1988 4.73 4.90 1,057,600
1989 5^42 5.42 1,160,253
" Adjusted for inflation to 1989 Honolulu consumer price index levels.
^ In U.S. dollars per lobster.
land and compete with other worldwide sources of lobster for the U.S. market
share. Landings of NWHI spiny and slipper lobsters account for <\% of the
worldwide lobster production and only 20% of U.S. production (Samples and
Gates, 1987). Therefore, NWHI fishermen are considered price takers in the
international lobster market, and supply interaction with demand is excluded from
our analysis.
Cost of Effort
Determining the economic cost of fishing effort can be a difficult process because
bioeconomic models are constructed to indicate the optimum social investment in
a fishery over the long run, while firm costs usually are viewed as short-run
phenomena. Our paper follows the usual microeconomic and bioeconomic as-
sumptions of a competitive market economy in which factor markets are in equi-
librium and maximization of profits (net revenue) is the firm's decision criterion.
Costs should reflect social opportunity costs (following Anderson, 1982). Prag-
matically, where there is information on average private costs (as is the case for
the NWHI lobster fishery), private costs closely approximate the social costs
(Anderson, 1982):
TC - c * E;
where TC is the total cost (per trap-haul); c, average cost (per trap-haul); and E,
effort (in trap-hauls). Cost per trap-haul should be chosen at the point which
approximates the minimum point on the long-run average cost curve, i.e., the
point of long-run industry equilibrium (ignoring biological effects). This can then
be assumed to be constant, which does not significantly affect the results (Ander-
son, 1982).
The cost of effort for the bioeconomic model can be estimated in two ways:
average fleet costs, which combine the costs from the three vessel classes com-124 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
prising the fleet, or "optimal" costs, which are derived from the vessel class {i.e.,
Class II) that appears to be best suited for this fishery (Clarke and Pooley, 1988).*"
The unweighted average fleet cost per trap-haul was $4.60 over the 3 years for
which detailed cost and operating information was available (I986-I988), com-
pared with $3.48 for the Class II vessels (the vessel class with the lowest cost per
trap-haul). We consider the latter to be the basic social opportunity cost of fishing
effort. However, this cost should be adjusted for imperfections in the labor market
in order to represent the long-run opportunity cost of lobster fishing.
The NWHI lobster fishery is a small component of Hawaii's economy and can
be viewed as a price taker for most inputs. Within any individual fishing trip,
extending fishing effort may increase marginal costs, but entry and exit patterns
of this fishery and variation in trip duration indicate that the flexibility of produc-
tive inputs is sufficient to view operating and vessel costs per unit effort as
constant. Furthermore, since lobster boats represent mobile capital capable of
shifting between different fisheries {e.g., Hawaii's longline fishery or the Pacific
Northwest's crab fisheries), the opportunity cost of capital is rcfiected by the
annualized market value of the vessels.
Oniy for labor does Hawaii's input market seem distorted for NWHI lobster
fishing vessels. Labor payments in commercial fishing are outside normal em-
ployment practices, and conditions on the NWHI lobster fishing vessels are out-
side the norm of other fishing fieets in Hawaii. As a result, a number of NWHI
lobster fishing vessel captains have had to hire crews from the Pacific Northwest
and pay for their transportation to and from Hawaii. This poses a substantial
problem for calculating the opportunity cost of labor since there is no truly com-
parable competitive labor market. Commercial fishing crews give up a certain
income and take on a particular way of life in hopes of receiving a portion of the
economic rents from the fishery and the profits of individually efficient producers.
(In 1986, crew members on larger lobster boats received $148 per fishing day,
while crew shares on the midsized boats ranged from $126 for efficient producers
to $79 for inefficient producers.) The opportunity cost of labor for commercial
fisheries has been calculated a number of different ways (Anderson, 1977; Clark,
1985). Clarke and Pooley (1988) argued that it is inappropriate to use manufac-
turing wage rates as proxies for the opportunity cost of labor on lobster boats
because there is no occupational equivalent to distant-water commercial fishing.
Instead, labor cost should be determined from the crew share at a point where the
fleet appears to be in open access equilibrium (OAE), i.e.. where there are no
rents. This can be viewed as the value of the marginal product of labor in which
no resource rents are accruing to the crew (or the vessel).
Cost-earnings data indicated the fieet was breaking even in 1986, with an
^ A cost-earnings study (Clarke and Pooley. 1988) on the economic performance on the
NWHI lobster fleet for 1986 revealed varying rates of return on lobster operations. Vessels
were classified according to their physical and operational characteristics, and while cer-
tain sectors of the fleet showed a positive return on investment, overall the fleet returned
$-198,000 on $6,214 million total revenue in 1986.
The vessel cost portion of the study included estimates on fixed and variable costs for
all of the classes. Fixed costs included estimated capital costs (10% of investment) and
annual repair, vessel insurance, administrative, and loan (interest payment) costs. Oper-
ating costs included all trip costs and crews and captains" shares. Vessel depreciation was
fixed at 4% but included a supplemental component if annual vessel repair was less than
10% of depreciation.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 125
average labor cost of $137.00 per crew member per fishing day (Clarke and
Pooley, 1988). This labor cost represents a wage rate of approximately $10.00 per
hour for 16-hour fishing days, substantially less than Hawaii's contract construc-
tion rate of $17.42 per hour in 1986 but about the same as the manufacturing wage
rate of $8.86 per hour. Recalculating vessel operating costs (Table 3) with this
labor cost provides the cost figure used in the remainder of our study: $2.97 per
trap-haul, the miniraum long-run average cost during a period of intensive fishing.
Bioeconomic Models
At a static equilibrium, dXIdt equals zero, and equations relating catch and effort
can be obtained for the Schaefer and Schnute models
C - qKE(l - qE/r), (10)
and for the Fox and CY&P models
C = qKEe -^^^ (H)
Once the yield-effort equations are established for the various models, reference
points important for evaluating anticipated or predicted fishing effort can be de-
termined by incorporating cost and revenue data. The economic portion of the
bioeconomic models, as proposed by Gordon (1954). assumes constant price {p)
for lobster and cost (c) for each unit of effort (or trap-haul), where revenue equals
pC and total cost equals cE. The relationship between cost and revenue implies,
that at OAE, biomass X is cl(pq) (Clark. 1985).
Static OAE or maximum economic yield (MEY) disregards the difference
between present and future values of funds. The idea behind MEY is that the
fishery is managed as a capita! good maximizing net present value (Clark, 1985).
The equation to solve for optimal biomass (A"*) under discounting is
c'[X*l G[X*]
Table 3























* Calculated in U.S. dollars as (I) fleet average cost, (2) minimum cost for Class II
vessels (most efficient), and (3) labor opportunity cost-adjusted minimum cost per trap-haul
when opportunity cost of labor is at open access equilibrium levels of fishing effort.126 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
where G[X] is the natural growth rate of lobster biomass (^. 5 is the real annual
discount rate, and c[X] = cl{qX) is the cost of catching one unit of biomass when
the present biomass is X.
In the Schaefer and Schnute models, as specified by Clark (1985),
G[X] = rX(l - X/K), (13)
and for the Fox and CY&P models,
G[X] = rX ln(K/X). (14)
I
Optimal biomass can be determined in the logistic model by
Optimal biomass for the Gompertz model can be determined iteratively by
O, (16)
which was derived from Equations 12 and 14 by using elementary calculus. Once
the values for optimal biomass have been determined for an appropriate range of
discount rates, then optimal yield {G[X*]) and optimal effort (£"*) can be deter-
mined by
For the Threshold model, the natural growth rate G cannot be expressed
explicitly in terms of A"*. Instead, E* is determined from a modification of Equa-
tion 12 (Appendix B). Our derivation involves an iteration of £* instead of A"*,
with E* determined iteratively from the equation
I k • c hG[E*]
kE* 1 cE*
P - G\E*\ A -
where
G\E*\ = A - Be'^^. (19)
The catchability coefficient q is assumed to be k in the Threshold model.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 127
Results
The Schaefer, Schnute, Fox, and CY&P production models are estimated using
OLS with 1982-1989 catch and effort data (from Table I);
Schaefer:
(U^^, - U,_,)/(2UJ = 0.672 - 0.277 U^ - 4.66 x lO-'E^.
r-statistic (2.62) (-3.02) (-3.18)*
R^ = 0.78 R^-bar = 0.64 DW = 2.01 D-h - -0.00644*
Schnute:'*^
ln(U^ + i/U^) = 1.43 - 0.512(U, + U^,,)/2 - 9.13 x lO'^d^ + E^^,)/2.
/-statistic (4.75)** (-5.25)** (-5.01)**
R^ = 0.90 R^-bar = 0.84 DW = 3.04 D-h = -1.31*
Fox:
(U« + , - U^_,)/(2U,) = 0.312 - 0.390 ln(U,) - 3.76 x 10"^ !„.
/-statistic (1.77) (-2.48) (-2.55)
R^ = 0.71 R--bar = 0.52 DW = 1.80 D-h = 0.266*
,) - 0.583 + 0.437 In(U^) - 2.80 x 10-''(En + E^^j).
/-statistic (4.37)* (4.49)* (-4.92)**
R^ - 0.98 R'-bar = 0.97 DW = 2.92 D-h = -1.16*
* P = 0.05
** p ^ 0.02
* = 1 iteration of Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for serial correlation.
All models, with the exception of the Fox, have coefficients with the proper
signs and /-statistics significant at the 5% level or better. The Durbin-Watson test
for autocorrelation was applied, but the number of observations is insufficient to
determine whether a significant problem exists (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981).128 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
Therefore we applied the Durbin h test to the Schaefer and Fox models and the
results support the null hypothesis of zero first-order autocorrelation. The Durbin
/i-statistic detected autocorrelation in the Schnute and CY&P models. The Co-
chrane-Orcutt procedure (Wittink, 1988) was applied as a correction to these
models (Table 4a).
The highest reported catch level for each individual species (Table 1)—1.85
million combined spiny and slipper lobsters—is used initially for A in the Thresh-
old model. Iteration of A to maximize R~ fails to converge to a value that we
believe is realistic for the fishery. Therefore, A is increased iteratively until the
improvement in the R- value is only 1% as proposed by Sathiendrakumar and
Tisdell (1987).
The Threshold model of the NWHI lobster fishery is estimated as




This can be rewritten as C - 1,900,000 - e^"t«-4),oooooi85E)^
X lO"*^ and B equal to 2,233,112.
Estimates of parameters r, q, and K for each model are given (Table 4a) along
with statistics showing the relative fit of these models to the time series data.
Because of the complex structure of the four models, exact variances of A^ could
not be obtained, and therefore the standard deviations of the alternative estimates
of MSY could not be calculated. Standard deviations of r, q, K. MSY and effort
- Table 4A
Values of Parameters Estimated by the Schaefer, Schnute, Fox. CY&P, and









































































•* No serial correlation at 5% level.
' Not sufriclently sensitive with n = 6.
r = intrinsic growth in year"'.
q = catchability in trap-hauls"',
k = Threshold catchabiiity in trap-hauls"'. '•
K = maximum biomass in number of legal lobsters.
B = Threshold virgin biomass in number of legal lobsters.
.4 = Threshold catch estimate in number of legal lobsters.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 229
at MSY were obtained from bootstrapping (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986) using the
Shazam statistical package (White et al. 1990). Sampling with replacement was
applied to the residuals of the regression used to test each model and a bootstrap
sample was created. Another regression was then performed on the bootstrap
sample which provided new estimates of r, q, K, MSY, and effort at MSY. This
procedure was performed a thousand times and the mean, standard deviation, and
coefficient of variation of each parameter were calculated (Table 4b). Based on
the coefficients of variation, instability was found in MSY for the Schnute model
and in parameter K and effort at MSY for the Fox and Schnute models. Although
the CY&P and the Schaefer models performed well, the results should be tem-
pered because of the small sample size.
The yield-effort curves for all five models are shown in Figure 2. The inclusion
of price and cost information in the production equations for the Schnute, CY&P,
and Threshold models is depicted in Figure 3. along with the relative positions of
MEY and OAE effort levels.
The four non-asymptotic models (Schaefer, Fox, Schnute. and CY&P) predict
Table 4B
Means, Standard Deviations (STD) and Coefficients of Variation (CV) of the
Bootstrap Estimates (n ^ 1000) of Parameters r. q. K, MSY and Effort at
MSY in the Schaefer, Schnute, Fox and CY&P Models for the Northwestern























































































r = intrinsic growth in year '.
q = catchability in trap-hauls"'.
k = maximum biomass in number of legal lobsters.
MSY = maximum sustainable yield in number of legal lobsters.
E(MSy) = fishing effort in trap-hauts at A/5 K level of production.130 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
MSY within a 22% range for this fishery (Table 5). Effort levels at MSY are
predicted within a 30% range for the four models, while estimated profits at MSY
vary 70% because of differences in predicted effort. Predictions of MSY for the
Threshold model are not relevant because the model uses an asymptotic maxi-
mum.
The five models show considerable differences in predicted optimums, i.e.,
MEY and effort. The MEY varies by as much as 54% while corresponding effort
varies by as much as 47%. Profit at MEY varies by 60%. Large differences also
exist between the Threshold and other models for predicted yield at OAE. The
Threshold model predicts a yield almost three times that of the Schaefer model,
whereas the non-asymptotic models estimate both yield and effort levels within
28%. These substantial differences demonstrate clearly the importance of model
choice.
Discounted optimal values for Y*, E*. X*, and U*, along with estimates of
resource rent {TR - TC, where TR is total revenue) are shown in Table 6. The
discount rates are representative of biological considerations (1% and 5%), social
accounting (10%), and private interest rates compounded by risk (25%) (Clark
1985). Model results at 0% (no discounting) and =c confirm values estimated for
static MEY and OAE (Table 5). All models show the same trends over the rele-
vant range (/ between 0% and 25%) although absolute values vary. On a percent-
age basis, estimated optimal effort values vary the most over alternative interest
rates within a model (5-24%). while estimated resource rents (i.e.. estimated
profit, not including consumer and producer surpluses) vary the least (0-7%). The
MEY varies most in the Fox model (11%) and least in the Threshold model (2%).
Optimal biomass levels and optimal catch per trap-haul vary by only 3-14%.
Discussion
Each of the models examined in the previous section—Fox, Schaefer, Schnute,
CY&P, and Threshold—appears to estimate valid biological parameters and rea-
Table 5
Static Biological Equilibrium (MSY), Economic Optimum (MEY), and



























































" Price equals $4,55/Iobster and cost is $2.97/trap-haul (Y = number of legal lobsters; E = trap-
hauls; $ = nel revenue in 1989 U.S. dollars).
^ By definition, al OAE, profit is equal to zero.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 131
Table 6
Optimal Values for Yield (Y*), Fishing Effort (£*), Biomass (X*), Profit (p),
and Catch per Unit Effort {(J*) for the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Lobster

























































































































































































































sonable economic results for the NWHl lobster fishery. Al! the models except the
Fox model have statistically significant coefficients, but because of the iterative
procedure used, the statistical results for the Threshold model have been forced.
The Threshold model's estimates contrast markedly with those of the other mod-
els. Although this contrast was expected because of the Threshold model's un-
derlying assumptions, we believed it necessary to explore its potential as a viable
model for this fishery.
The CY&P model has the best fit with the data {R^ = 0.98) while the Schnute
has the strongest r-statistics {P < 0.02). The logistic models (Schaefer and
Schnute) have a strong body of theoretical literature supporting their applicability
to fishery science, whereas models using the Gompertz curve (e.g., the Fox
model) apparently have less acceptance.


















. 9 8 Y VT V ^~~A.-,, ^^
\\
0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000
EFFORT (TRAP-HAULS)
Figure 2. Yield-effort relationships for the Schaefer, Schnute, Fox, CY&P, and Threshold
models.
(Schnute and CY&P) models to estitnate biological parameters from time series
catch and effort data appears to involve a debate over whether the CPUE data
employed represent an annual or instantaneous estimate of relative abundance
(Pella and Tomlinson, 1969; Schnute. 1977). We believe that the integrated models
are theoretically stronger and should be used for the NWHI lobster fishery be-
cause of the trends in actual effort and CPUE. For a more complete discussion of
dynamic models, see Schnute (1989).
Validation of the CY&P by independent estimates is difficult. Clarke and
Pooley (1988) have shown that in aggregate the NWHI commercial lobster fleet
broke even during 1986 while expending 1.35 million trap-hauls. If this level of
effort is assumed to be approximately representative of OAE, the Fox and CY&P
models predict OAE effort accurately. Using similar cost-earnings data and a
simple linear CPUE and effort relationship. Samples and Sproul (1987) estimated
MEY in the NWHI commercial lobster fishery based on Class II vessels at
893,000 trap-nights with potential economic profits of $2.33 million. While their
estimate of economic profit appears to agree with the values from the CY&P and
Schaefer models, predicted effort is different, even when corrected for differences
between the effort variables, trap-night versus trap-hauls (cf. Clarke and Todoki,
1988). The MEY predicted by each of our models, with the exception of the
Threshold model, falls between 528,000 and 599,000 trap-hauls, substantially less
than that predicted by Samples and Sproul (1987). The Fox model is the most
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Figure 3. Revenue-effort and cost functions for the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands lobster
fishery, using the Schnute (S), CY&P (C), and Threshold (T) models (S, C, and T = the
effort levels for open access equilibrium; S*, C*. T* = the net revenue and fishing efFort
levels for maximum economic yield).
Polovina and Moffitt (1989), using different procedures, estimated MSY for the
fishery at 1.14 million spiny and slipper lobsters from 848,000 trap-hauls. The
Schnute model best approximates this value in terms of yield (I.I million), but
predicts lower effort levels lo obtain the given yield (780,000 trap-hauls). Accord-
ing to Polovina and Moffitt (1989), the yield for 1988 (1.1 million combined spiny
and slipper lobsters) falls within the 95% confidence intervals of their model.
However, from a bioeconomic point of view, profits (with crews accruing some of
the rent) have been estimated at $1.2 million for the fishery in the same year
(Clarke, 1989). This estimate of resource rent (profit) is substantially less than that
predicted at MSY effort levels and more in line with that predicted by the CY&P
model.
Significant differences in results also are due to the choice of cost estimate
(Table 3). These differences are summarized in Table 7. If the CY&P model and
the labor opportunity cost adjusted average minimum class II cost ($2.97 per
trap-haul) are used, then fleet profits at MSY are $1.7 million and resource rent at
MEY is $2.4 million. MEY occurs at 589.000 trap-hauls (919,000 lobsters). With
the average minimum class II costs ($3.52 per trap-haul), without the labor op-
portunity cost adjustment, profits at MSY drop to $1.2 million, and MEY is
estimated to occur at 536,000 trap-hauls yielding 882,000 lobsters, with potential
resource rent of $2.1 million. Using the fleet average cost per trap-haul ($4.29),134 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
Table 7
Differences in Resource Rent at Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) and Fleet
Profit at Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) with Alternative Cost Parameters
for the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Lobster Fishery Using the CY&P
Model. Million U.S. Dollars
Cost Alternative" Rent (MEY) Profit (MSY)
(1) Fleet average 1.7 0.4
(2) Minimum (Class II) 2.1 1.2
(3) Labor opportunity cost (Class II) 2.4 1.7
' (Table 3)
fleet profits at MSY drop to $396,000, and MEY effort is 469,000 trap-hauls,
yielding 824,977 lobsters and a potential resource rent of $1.7 million.
The effects of discounting on the models appear to be universally limited for
the results presented. All models show that the resource rent will change negli-
gibly even when discounted effort levels may vary as much as 24% over the
relevant range. The MEY and associated resource rent are relatively insensitive to
choice of discount rates. Tbese results are supported by studies that suggest
fisheries management policy is often insensitive to changes in the discount factor
over a range of values likely to be found in practice (e.g., Mendelssohn, 1982).
Tbe open access CPUE levels converge to 0.65 for all models as expected,
because of tbe theoretical importance of cost-price ratios in establishing OAE
(Clark, 1985). If the minimum fleet average cost per trap-haul ($2.97) and the 1988
price ($4.74 per lobster) are used, then CPUE levels at OAE converge at 0.63.
wbich is essentially tbe same as the ratio of the minimum cost per trap-haul ($2.97)
to the average 1986-1988 ex-vessel price ($4.55) per lobster. Despite the fact that
all major banks had been extensively fished, the OAE CPUE values are substan-
tially below the catch rates exhibited in the fishery over the past 3 years of
intensive tlshing effort.
Although the CY&P model appears to have a strong fit and validated results,
its appropriateness must be tempered. The analysis of the fishery is of one unit
stock rather than separating the two major species, spiny and slipper lobster. At
tbe same time, there is noticeable, if not quantifiable, targeting by the fieet as a
whole and by segments of the fleet on different species. If a model that integrates
tbe economic and biological differences of the two species were developed, it
would more accurately reflect the bioeconomics of the fishery. Presumably size
measures could be altered to reflect such differences, or there could be species-
specific quotas (either fleet-wide or individual vessel).
Conclusion
With rapidly developing, high-value fisheries such as the NWHl lobster fishery,
resource managers have limited research dollars and yet are forced to make man-
agement decisions based on relatively limited biological and economic data. Sur-
plus production models are useful in such situations because of their relatively
limited data requirements, although some {e.g., Townsend 1986) question their
applicability.Bioeconomics of the Hawaii Lobster Fishery 135
All of the models explored show reasonable results, but tbe CY&P model
appears to be the best for economic analysis in the NWHl lobster fishery. Tbis
conclusion is tempered by the relatively short time series of data used and the fact
that our data set is limited to the ascending limb of the yield-effort relationship.
However, Yoshimoto and Clarke (in press) applied this model to other lobster
catch and effort data and found tbe CY&P model has an equal or better fit and
robustness than the other integrated model explored (Schnute). These fisheries
provided substantially longer time series of CPUE data (New Zealand rock lob-
ster, 1945-1987; Tasmanian rock lobster, 1947-1984; American (New England)
lobster, 1950-1979).
The use of integrated surplus production models (Scbnute and CY&P) as
compared to the more conventionally applied Schaefer and Fox finite difference
models would allow more liberal effort rates in the NWHl lobster fishery, as well
as predicting higher levels of revenue at tbe economic optima (MEY). However,
this may not always be the case and would depend on the catch-effort relationship
of the specific fishery for which they are applied. As for the comparison between
the integrated models. Schnute (1977) points out that a problem with his model is
that the predicted variable. U^ ^.,. appears on both sides^f the_regression eqjiation
and it is not clear which term should be regressed on (ln(Un+ ,/Un) or (U^ -I- U^^ ,)/
2). As a result, better regression fits are expected from the CY&P model since its
functional form is more straightforward than that of the Schnute model.
Each of the models tested for the NWHl lobster fishery demonstrates that,
although the combined yield of spiny and slipper lobsters was not excessive
biologically, capital inputs must be adjusted downward if resource rents or profits
are to be maximized in the future. The NWHl lobster fishery for 1987-1989 was
within MSY norms (given that no data are available on species targeting by fisb-
ermen). but by the reference points of the CY&P model, fishing effort has ex-
ceeded MEY (assuming "fishing up" has been completed). In the absence of
evidence of biological overfishing on the combined stocks and no means of cap-
turing resource rents when restricting effort to MEY levels, there was little like-
lihood of the adoption of access limitations or individual transferable quotas in
order to optimize the fishery economically. Indeed, many participants in tbe
fishery clearly expressed their hostility to effort regulation in 1987-1988 despite
the fishery's approach to OAE in 1986. The diminished effort in 1987-1988 sug-
gested that, to a certain extent, the fishery could be self-regulating. Cost-earnings
data on vessel operation and performance appeared to confirm our hypothesis that
the fishery may be self-regulating. Also supporting this hypothesis are tbe rela-
tively large investments needed to gear up for fishing and tbe potentially cata-
strophic financial results of a shortened or poor trip (Clarke and Pooley 1988).
On the other hand, exogenous events do exist and are as near at hand as the
recent, rapid expansion of the Hawaii longline fleet and as distant as the dimin-
ishing yields in the Bering Sea, Gulf of Alaska, and Gulf of Mexico fisheries, any
of which could bring a large influx of new vessels into the NWHl lobster fishery.
The effects of a substantial increase in effort can only be surmised from the
models presented. Not surprisingly, faced with the prospect of renewed partici-
pation by vessels from Hawaii's other fisheries (e.g., tuna and swordfish longlin-
ers), interest in limited entry returned. The limitations of fishery-wide stock pro-
duction models were also revealed by the apparent recruitment (or catchability)
crisis in 1989-90. However, tbe logistics of regulation and enforcement appear to136 Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
mitigate against any bank-by-bank approach to fisheries management. Therefore,
assiduous monitoring and evaluation of the key economic and biological signals
available in this fishery, including informal information from vessel owners and
operators, remain important.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the CY&P Model
Substituting X = U/q into Equation 3 and multiplying both sides by q/U gives
(1/U) dU/dt = r ln(qK) - r ln(U) - qE.
Integrating from t = year n to t = year n + 1 yields
ln(U < n + 1 >/U < n >) = r In(qK) - r f"^' ln(U)dt - qEn; (Al)
where U(n) is the instantaneous CPUE at the start of year n, and £„ is the total
effort for year n.
The first degree Taylor polynomial for In(LO centered at U,,, the average
CPUE for year n, is
In(U) - ln(UJ -
= ln(UJ - I + (U/UJ.
Integration of this approximation yields
f"^' In(U)dt = ln(Un) - 1 + (1/Un) p''' Udt. (A2)
Jn Jn
By definition, (/„ ^ /{j^' Udt, so Equation A2 becomes
f"^' ln(U)dt =
Jn
Putting this result into Equation Al gives
ln(U(n + 1)/U<n» - r in(qK) - r
Adding this equation to its corresponding {n + l)th equation gives
ln((U(n + 2)U<n + l))/(U<n + l)U<n))) = 2r in(qK) - r(ln(Uj
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We use Schnute's (1977) assumption to estimate for instantaneous CPUE
U^ = SQRT(U(n + l)U(n));
that is, the CPUE of a given year is the geometric mean of the CPUE's at the
beginning and ending of that year. Plugging this estimate of CPUE into Equation
A3 and solving algebraically for \x\{U^^^) gives
= (2r/(2 + r)) ln(qK) + ((2 - r)/(2 + r)) ln(Uj
The results of the above equation are dependent on how good an approxima-
tion the Taylor polynomial gives. If instantaneous values of^PUE for a given
year, n, are suspected to fluctuate considerably away from (/„, the Taylor ap-
proximation becomes invalid and another method to estimate the integral of ln(U)
is needed. As a crude indicator of how reasonable the approximation is, average
monthly CPUEs (H^ denotes the average monthly CPUE for month k) are assumed
to be represejitative of the_instantaneous CPUEs for a given year. The terms





















Note: Ak = In(U^) - I + nj\5^.
The Taylor approximation appears to introduce relatively small errors, and its
use with the above data appears warranted.
Appendix B
Derivation of Discounting for the Threshold Model
From the Threshold model, with catch written as G
ln(A - G) - ln(B) - kE
= ln(B) - kG/(qX).
Taking the derivative (with respect to X) of both sides:
- G))G'LX] = - ^Clarke, Yoshimoto, and Pooley
Solving for G'[X]
kG/(qX^)
^'^^^ " k/(qX) - 1/(A - G) •
Inserting G'[Xl and c'[Xl = -c/(qX^) into Equation 12 yields
• kG/(q(X*)2)
J -i: ^ R
k/{qX*) - 1/(A - G) p - c/(qX*)
Multiplying both sides by q(X*)~/G yields
k c 5q(X*)2 k/(qX*) - I/(A - G) p - c/(qX*) G
Plugging in G/{qE*) for A'* gives Equation 18 in the text.